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THE REASONABLE GIRL: A NEW REASONABLENESS
STANDARD TO DETERMINE SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN
SCHOOLS
Carrie L. Hoon
Abstract: The U.S. Supreme Court held in Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education
that schools may be liable under Title IX of the 1972 Education Amendments for student-to-
student hostile-environment sexual harassment. Although the Court required that conduct be
severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive to qualify as sexual harassment under the statute,
it did not establish an objective reasonableness standard to evaluate allegedly harassing
conduct. In the context of Title VII employment-discrimination jurisprudence, some courts
apply a reasonable-woman standard to determine what conduct is objectively hostile or
abusive such that it constitutes actionable hostile-environment sexual harassment in the
workplace. This Comment argues that a reasonable-girl standard, which is an amalgamation
of reasonable-woman precedent and the reasonable child from tort law, is consistent with
previous U.S. Supreme Court interpretations of Title IX. This Comment further contends that
courts should adopt the reasonable-girl standard because it will further girls' equal
educational opportunities, thereby serving the goal of Title IX.
In February of 2000, a thirteen-year-old girl in Federal Way,
Washington, filed a complaint against Kilo Junior High School for
failing to prevent a classmate from repeatedly accosting her in the
school's hallways and reaching under her clothing to grope her.' The
school had responded to the girl's complaint of harassment by having her
confront her alleged perpetrator, whom she feared, and eventually
suggesting that she leave the school district, which she did.2 The school
never punished the perpetrator? The experience caused the girl's grades
to suffer and left her feeling as though she had no friends.4
This thirteen-year-old girl is not alone. Despite studies chronicling the
prevalence of sexual harassment in schools and its adverse effects on
girls, including reduced academic performance and damaged emotional
well-being,5 the U.S. Supreme Court has not yet established an objective
standard that schools and courts can use to determine what types of
conduct rise to the level of sexual harassment. Consequently, Kilo Junior
1. Nancy Bartley & Lisa Pemberton-Butler, Student's Suit Blames School for Harassment,
SEATrLE TIMES, Jan. 19,2000, at Bl.
2 Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See infra Part IA.
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High School's administrators had no guidance to determine whether the
conduct the thirteen-year-old girl complained of amounted to sexual
harassment for which the school could become liable.
In some circuits, the courts of appeals have been one step ahead of the
U.S. Supreme Court in adopting a reasonableness standard to aid in
determining what conduct constitutes hostile-environment sexual harass-
ment. In the workplace context, these courts have adopted a gender-
specific reasonable-woman standard, rather than a gender-neutral
reasonable-person standard, in determining what is objectively hostile or
abusive.6 Under Title IX, a statute that prohibits sex discrimination in
schools, the U.S. Supreme Court has determined that sexual harassment
is a form of sex discrimination and thus violates the statute.7 In Davis v.
Monroe County Board of Education, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
schools may be held liable for student-to-student hostile-environment
sexual harassment.9 However, by focusing the inquiry on whether a
school has taken appropriate steps to remedy the harassment rather than
on the type of conduct that amounts to sexual harassment in schools, the
Davis Court neglected to establish a reasonableness standard to
determine whether allegedly harassing conduct is objectively offensive
and thus amounts to actionable hostile-environment sexual harassment. 0
This Comment examines the standards of reasonableness by which
student-to-student sexual harassment should be evaluated when girls in
junior high and high school are the victims and boys are the
6. Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878-79 (9th Cir. 1991).
7. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992).
8. 526 U.S. 629 (1999).
9. Id. at 650. There is great disagreement regarding what conduct constitutes hostile-environment
sexual harassment. This Comment adopts the U.S. Supreme Court's definition of sexual harassment,
meaning conduct such as comments, gestures, or unwelcome touching that is so severe, pervasive,
and objectively hostile or abusive that it limits the victim's access to equal opportunity. See, e.g.,
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 78 (1998); Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510
U.S. 17, 21 (1993). Different courts of appeals have found hostile-environment sexual harassment to
stem from different conduct. Compare Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 632-33 (2d Cir. 1997)
(holding that calling woman "dumb cunt" and telling her to "stay home, go on welfare, and collect
food stamps like the rest of the 'spics' constituted hostile environment), and Ellison, 924 F.2d at
878 (holding that continuing to send love letters despite request to stop constituted hostile
environment), with DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass'n, 51 F.3d 591, 596 (5th Cir.
1995) (holding that derogatory comments about women in general and plaintiff in particular
published in monthly workplace newsletter could not amount to hostile-environment sexual
harassment), and Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 622 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding that
pornographic comments and pictures that sexually objectified plaintiff did not create hostile
environment).
10. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 650.
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perpetrators." Part I of this Comment provides an overview of sexual
harassment in schools. Part II explores previous judicial interpretations
of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972. Part m discusses
competing reasonableness standards that courts use to determine what
conduct is objectively offensive-the reasonable-person standard, the
reasonable-woman standard, and the reasonable-person-in-the-plaintiffs-
position standard-and the U.S. Supreme Court's position regarding
these standards. Part IV argues that courts should adopt a reasonable-girl
standard when determining the objective offensiveness of harassing
conduct under Title IX because this standard both comports with
previous U.S. Supreme Court interpretations of the statute and best
serves the purposes of the statute. This Comment concludes that the
reasonable-girl standard would put girls on an even playing field with
boys with regard to educational opportunities.
I. SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN SCHOOLS
Statistics show that sexual harassment in schools is prevalent and has
many negative effects on girls. In Davis, the U.S. Supreme Court
addressed this problem by finding that schools that allow girls to
continue to be harassed by their peers may be liable in private actions
brought under Title IX. Davis extended case law that had found that
individuals may bring private actions against schools when they are
deliberately indifferent to known sexual harassment to include school
liability for student-to-student sexual harassment.
A. The Prevalence and Effects of Sexual Harassment in Schools
Empirical evidence collected throughout the past decade demonstrates
that sexual harassment in schools is prevalent and that girls are common
victims of sexual violence. Half of the high school girls surveyed in one
study reported having been sexually harassed in school. 2 A study of
junior high school students found that 17% reported having been
II. The "reasonable-girl standard" is one standard that may be used to determine whether alleged
harassment is objectively offensive such that it may amount to sexual harassment. Although the
reasonable-girl standard may be applicable in same-sex harassment cases, or in cases where boys are
the victims and girls are the perpetrators, these situations are beyond the scope of this Comment. The
gender issues at play in those two instances could affect the type of standard that would be
appropriate.
12 Susan Fineran et al., Teenage Peer Sexual Harassment: Implicationsfor Social WorkPractice
in Education, 43 Soc. WORK 55,56 (1998).
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sexually coerced by a teenager, 19% reported feeling pressure from their
friends to have intercourse, 7% reported having been sexually coerced by
an adult, and 6% reported having sexually coerced someone else.'
3
Another study found that 7% of respondents, primarily women between
the ages eighteen and twenty-two, had experienced at least one episode
of involuntary sexual intercourse during childhood or adolescence, while
less than one-half of these experiences occurred before age fourteen.'4
The majority of these unwanted sexual experiences happened to girls
between the ages of thirteen and sixteen.1"
Sexual harassment in schools can be devastating to girls both
academically and emotionally. Empirical evidence focused on high
school students demonstrates that sexual harassment can lead to
absenteeism, decreased quality of schoolwork, skipping or dropping
classes, lower grades, loss of friends, tardiness, and truancy, all of which
may result in ineligibility for specific colleges or merit scholarships and
loss of recommendations for awards, colleges, or jobs. 6 Furthermore,
early adolescents who were less successful academically were more
likely to have been coerced sexually. 7
B. Davis v. Monroe County Board of Education Extended School
Liability for Sexual Harassment to Include Liability for Student-To-
Student Sexual Harassment
In Davis, the U.S. Supreme Court held that a school could be liable
under Title IX for allowing known student-to-student harassing conduct
to occur. 8 The plaintiff in Davis was a fifth-grade girl. Another student
had touched and rubbed up against her breasts and genital area, and told
her vulgar statements such as "I want to get in bed with you" and "I want
to feel your boobs."' 9 The girl's mother complained to the school
principal, but the school took no disciplinary action; meanwhile the
harassment continued for months, stopping only when the harasser was
13. Timothy R. Jordan et al., Junior High School Students' Perceptions Regarding Noncon-
sensual Sexual Behavior, 68 J. SCH. HEALTH 289, 291 (1998).
14. Kristin Anderson Moore et al., Nonvoluntary Sexual Activity Among Adolescents, 21 FAM.
PLAN. PERSP. 110, 111 (1989).
15. Pamela 1. Erickson et al., Unwanted Sexual Experiences Among Middle and High School
Youth, 12 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 319, 321 (1991).
16. Fineran et al., supra note 12, at 55.
17. Jordan et al., supra note 13, at 290.
18. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 633 (1999).
19. Id.
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charged with sexual battery." The Court concluded that the school had
created a hostile environment for the girl by allowing the harassment to
continue for months and found that the school could be held liable under
Title IX for its deliberate indifference to the harassment.2
Davis extended prior cases holding schools liable for inaction in the
face of known harassment. In Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public
Schools, the plaintiff was a student who had been subjected by a teacher
to continued sexual harassment that included sexually oriented
conversations, forced kissing, and coercive intercourse.' The school
district allegedly became aware of the teacher's misconduct and
investigated but took no remedial action until the victim filed the
lawsuit. 4 The U.S. Supreme Court found that under Title IX, the statute
that prohibits sex discrimination in schools, sexual harassment may
amount to sex discrimination and held the school liable for the teacher's
actions.' The plaintiff in Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School
District26 was an eighth-grade student when her teacher began making
sexually suggestive comments to her.2 The school responded to
complaints of these comments by telling the teacher to be careful about
his classroom comments.28 Nevertheless, the teacher initiated sexual
contact with the plaintiff, kissed and fondled her, and later engaged in
sexual intercourse with her, often during class time 9 The Court
concluded that schools may only be held liable for taking inadequate
remedial action when they have been informed of the harassment."
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF TITLE IX IN LIGHT OF
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, TITLE VI, AND TITLE VII
The U.S. Supreme Court has examined Title IX sexual harassment in
schools from three perspectives. First, the fact that Title IX is a contract
20. Id. at 634.
21. See id. at 653-54.
22. 503 U.S. 60 (1992).
23. Id. at 63.
24. Id. at 64.
25. See id. at 75.
26. 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
27. I. at 277-78.
28. Id. at 278.
29. Id.
30. See i at 290.
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between schools and the federal government is the foundation on which
all U.S. Supreme Court interpretations of the statute are built.3' Second,
the Court has analogized Title IX to Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights
Act,32 interpreting Title IX as a contractual agreement that not only
explicitly calls for administrative remedies, but also implicitly allows
private causes of action when schools act with deliberate indifference to
the rights of students by taking clearly unreasonable remedial actions.
33
Lastly, the Court has relied on Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
34
when interpreting sex discrimination under Title IX to include hostile-
environment sexual harassment when a school has actual notice of the
harassment.35
A. Title IKIs a Binding Contractual Agreement that Prohibits Schools
from Discriminating on the Basis of Sex
Title IX36 of the 1972 Education Amendments 37 is a contract between
schools and the federal government that conditions federal funding on a
promise to "end sex discrimination in schools. This statute prohibits
schools from excluding, on the basis of sex, students from the
participation in or benefits of any federally funded educational activity."
Implementing regulations provide that a school district receiving federal
funding shall not "otherwise limit any person in the enjoyment of any
right, privilege, advantage, or opportunity."39 Courts have also used Title
IX to remedy broad-based discrimination in admissions and athletic
programs.
40
Title X's contractual nature controls when and how schools may
become liable in private actions. Enacted pursuant to Congress's
31. See, e.g., Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 640 (1999); Gebser, 524 U.S.
at 286; Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60,75 (1992); Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441
U.S. 677, 704 (1979).
32 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
33. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 648.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
35. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 648.
36. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994).
37. Pub. L. No. 92-318, 86 Stat. 373 (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 1681).
38. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a).
39. 34 C.F.R. § 106.3 1(b)(7) (1999).
40. See, e.g., Favia v. Ind. Univ. of Penn., 7 F.3d 332, 343-44 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that
university receiving federal funding must make same amount of money available to women's and
men's athletic programs); Berkelman v. S.F. Unified Sch. Dist., 501 F.2d 1264, 1269-70 (9th Cir.
1974) (holding that school district may not apply higher admission standards to girls than to boys).
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spending powers,4 Title IX makes the initial and continued provision of
federal funding for educational programs and activities contingent upon
the schools' promise not to discriminate on the basis of sex.42 The Court
has concluded that because Title IX is a contract, rather than a broad-
based remedial measure such as Title VII, liability may not arise under it
unless educational institutions have been notified that they may become
liable.43 Contractual statutes such as Title IX, enacted pursuant to the
Spending Clause," prohibit only intentional discrimination.4" For a
school to intentionally violate Title IX when it is not the actual harasser,
it must have actual knowledge of the harassment, know what standard to
use to determine whether the harassment rises to the level of
discrimination, ' and ignore harassment that amounts to a violation of the
statute such that it allows discrimination against the victim.47 In the
administrative-remedy context, this means that the Department of
Education (DOE) must notify a school of its violation of the statute and
offer the school an opportunity to remedy the situation before remedies
are imposed upon it.48 In the private-action context, this means that
schools may be liable for damages only when they had actual notice of
discrimination, had an opportunity to remedy the discrimination, and
were deliberately indifferent to known discrimination.49
Only deliberate indifference will support monetary damages in private
Title IX actions.5" To make schools liable for their own inaction, the
Court in Gebser held schools liable for allowing discrimination to
41. Gebserv. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274,287 (1998).
42. See id. at 286.
43. See dL at 290.
44. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
45. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 74-75 (1992).
46. When school administrators investigate and resolve claims of sexual harassment of students,
they are guided by the Department of Education (DOE) Office of Civil Rights Guidance on Sexual
Harassment, which has been cited with approval by the U.S. Supreme Court, applies to students at
every level of education, and is intended to inform officials of the standards and procedures that
schools are expected to follow under Title IX. Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students
by School Employees, Other Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034, 12,034 (March 13,
1997); see also Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 651 (1999). Although
implementation of the standard proposed by this Comment would require a change in the standard at
some regulatory level before a school could become liable under the new standard, details regarding
implementation are beyond the scope of this Comment.
47. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 287.
48. See id at 288.
49. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 643-44.
50. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290. Monetary damages include both punitive and compensatory
damages. See id at 285-86.
Washington Law Review
continue despite actual notice of the discrimination." The Court
determined that agency liability of any kind, like that arising under Title
VII when a party has constructive knowledge and thus should have
known that discrimination was taking place, is untenable under Title IX
given the statute's contractual nature and the notice requirement that
flows from it.5 2 Only when schools' intentional discrimination through
deliberate indifference subjects victims of discrimination to further
harassment is the threshold of action met. 3 For example, in Davis the
school became liable by refusing to take any remedial action in response
to known acts of harassment such as the persistent unwanted groping and
fondling of a fifth-grade girl. 4
The "clearly unreasonable" standard governs the determination of
deliberate indifference." Courts will deem school administrators' actions
or lack thereof deliberately indifferent only if their responses to
harassment that is severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive are clearly
unreasonable in light of the known circumstances. 6 While the U.S.
Supreme Court has not clarified its definition of this standard in the Title
IX context, it has explained why it uses the standard and how it expects
courts to utilize it. 7 In her majority opinion in Davis, Justice O'Connor
stated that the clearly unreasonable standard would allow administrators
considerable discretion to determine what remedial response was
appropriate, because the judiciary should "refrain from second guessing
the disciplinary decisions made by school administrators."58 She
emphasized that this standard is not one of "mere reasonableness" and
that courts should be able to determine for themselves on motions for
directed verdict whether the school's response was clearly unreason-
able.59 Finally, she stated that this standard would allow sufficient
flexibility for schools of different types to address harassment
51. See id. at 285.
52. See id. at 287-88.
53. Id. at 290.
54. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 653-54.
55. Id. at 648-49.
56. Id. at 648 ("School administrators will continue to enjoy the flexibility they require so long as
funding recipients are deemed 'deliberately indifferent' to acts of student-on-student harassment
only where the recipient's response to the harassment or lack thereof is clearly unreasonable in light
of the known circumstances.").
57. See id. at 648-49.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 649.
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commensurate with the level of control they have over their students.'
One method of showing that the school's response was clearly
unreasonable under Title IX is to demonstrate, as the Davis plaintiff did,
that by failing to respond in any way to her complaints of sexual
harassment the school board in effect subjected the student to continued
discrimination." The Court has not yet decided a case in which the
plaintiffs alleged that a school responded, but did so in a clearly
unreasonable manner.
B. Liability Arises Similarly Under Both Title IX and Title VI
Because Congress patterned Title IX after Title VI and intended both
statutes to end discrimination in schools,62 courts have looked to Title VI
liability standards to determine when liability arises under Title IX.63
Title VI forbids the use of federal funds in programs that discriminate on
racial grounds.' Title VI has both an administrative remedy, which
authorizes the DOE to investigate and force educational institutions to
comply with the statute or risk the loss of federal funding, and a private
remedy, which makes schools liable to victimized students for allowing
race discrimination to continue.6' A school becomes liable under Title VI
when there is a racially hostile environment of which the district has
notice but fails adequately to remedy.'
In addition to the potential loss of federal funding, educational
institutions also face liability for monetary damages under Title IX when
sex discrimination occurs in their programs and activities. In Cannon v.
University of Chicago,67 the U.S. Supreme Court held that under Title IX
victims of such sex discrimination could bring a private cause of action
against educational institutions.6 The Court's decision rested on four
grounds. First, the Court noted that the legislative history of Title IX
indicates congressional approval of Title VI's statutory enforcement
60. Id.
61. Id. at 646-47, 654.
62. See 117 CONG. REC. 39,252 (1971); 110 CONG. REC. 7062 (1964); 110 CONG. REC. 1540
(1964).
63. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 287 (1998).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566 (1974) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d).
65. See Monteiro v. Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1033 (9th Cir. 1998).
66. Id.
67. 441 U.S. 677 (1979).
68. See iXt at 705-08.
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procedures, which include a private remedy.69 Second, because the Court
had already interpreted Title VI as allowing private causes of action, the
Court observed that the similarities between Titles VI and IX supported
interpreting the latter as giving rise to private remedies. 70 Third, the
Court noted that the administrative procedure for cutting off federal
financial support for institutions was an insufficient remedy for victims
of sex discrimination.7' Finally, the Court reasoned that a private remedy
would enhance the efficiency of the enforcement mechanism of an
exclusively administrative scheme because the burden of proof for a
single plaintiff-that a violation of the statute occurred-is much lower
than the "pervasive discrimination" required for agency action.72
C. Courts Have Looked to Title VII Jurisprudence To Define Sex
Discrimination Under Title IX
Courts often look to Title VII case law to determine what behaviors
Congress meant to proscribe when it stated that "sex discrimination" was
a violation of Title IX. In the Title IX context, courts rely on Title VII
precedent holding that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination,
defining sexual harassment as conduct that is severe, pervasive, and
objectively offensive.73 Further, the Court cited Title VII precedent when
finding that Title IX protects subordinates and students from harassment
by superiors and peers.74
While courts look to Title VI to determine standards of liability under
Title IX, they also look to Title VII to determine what conduct amounts
to sex discrimination under Title IX. Title VII prohibits sex
discrimination in the employment context.75 Courts have interpreted this
statute as prohibiting both quid pro quo sexual harassment76 and hostile-
69. Id. at 706 n.40; see also 118 CONG. REC. 5807 (1972); 118 CONG. REC. 5806-07 (1972); 117
CONG. REC. 30,408 (1971).
70. See Cannon, 441 U.S. at 704-05.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 705.
73. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650-51 (1999) (citing Meritor Sav.
Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986)); Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75
(1992).
74. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 651; Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75.
75. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1999).
76. Quid pro quo sexual harassment under Title VII involves a supervisor offering an employee
tangible goods such as job benefits in exchange for sexual favors. See, e.g., Henson v. City of
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897,908-09 (11 th Cir. 1982) (finding that employer may not require employee to
exchange sexual favors for job benefits). Quid pro quo sexual harassment is the easier form of sexual
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environment sexual harassment7 when the harassment interferes with the
victim's working conditions such that she no longer has equal
opportunity to work.78 In Meitor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson,79 the
U.S. Supreme Court first recognized an action under Title VII for
hostile-environment sexual harassment, defining it as conduct by the
employer that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the victim's
conditions of employment."0 Thus, only that sexual harassment that alters
the conditions of employment is actionable under Title VII, whereas
harassment that does not rise to the level of interfering with the
conditions of employment is not actionable."' The Court justified this
recognition of hostile-environment sexual harassment on the same
grounds that it has used to recognize the need to prevent racial
harassment, stating that requiring a man or woman to "'run a gauntlet of
sexual abuse in return for the privilege of being allowed to work
can... be as demeaning and disconcerting as the harshest of racial
epithets."' 8
2
The U.S. Supreme Court and some federal circuit courts have looked
to Title VII case law to determine whether sexual harassment has
occurred under Title IX.83 In Davis, the Court defined hostile-
environment sexual harassment as conduct that is severe, pervasive, and
objectively offensive such that it undermines the victim's educational
experience and frustrates the purpose of Title IX: to afford everyone the
benefit of equal access to education. 4 By adopting the Mertor definition
of sex discrimination for Title IX purposes, the Davis Court equated sex
harassment to identify because of its obvious harm to the plaintiff. See Jolynn Childers, Note, Is
There a Place for a Reasonable Woman in the Law? A Discussion of Recent Developments in
Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment, 42 DUKE LJ. 854, 860 (1993). Further, it is generally
agreed on that this type of harassment is objectionable. Sharon J. Bittner, Note, The Reasonable
Woman Standard After Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.: The Debate Rages On, 16 WOMEN'S RTS. L.
REP. 127, 128 (1994).
77. See generally supra note 9.
78. See Meritor Say. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-67 (1986).
79. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
80. Id. at 67. Although the Court later eliminated the distinction between quid pro quo and
hostile-environment sexual harassment in the employment context, see Burlington Indus., Inc. v.
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 754 (1998), Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 802 (1998), this
Comment does not rely on or reference a distinction between the two types of sexual harassment.
81. See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67.
82. Id. (quoting Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902 (11th Cir. 1982)).
83. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992); Oona, R.-S.- v. Mc-
Caffrey, 143 F.3d 473,477 (9th Cir. 1998).
84. See supra notes 79-82.
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discrimination with sexual harassment.85 The Davis Court concluded that
a hostile environment can be created by verbal as well as physical
harassment.86 In addition, the Ninth Circuit has explicitly concluded that
"Title VII standards apply to hostile environment claims under Title
IX,"' 87 using Title VII precedent to interpret sex discrimination under
Title IX.
The U.S. Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have also cited Title
VII case law as precedent for protecting students from harassment by a
superior. In Franklin, the Court established that a school district can be
liable for damages in cases involving a teacher's sexual harassment of a
student.88 The Court reasoned that the teacher-student relationship in the
educational context is analogous to the supervisor-subordinate
relationship in the employment discrimination context.89 The Court relied
on Meritor as persuasive authority for imposing liability on the school
district.' By explaining how school liability arises, the Franklin Court
also clarified its reference to Meritor in Gebser, where it held that a
school district is not liable for damages in a teacher-student sexual
harassment case "unless an official who at a minimum has authority to
address the alleged discrimination and to institute corrective
measures... has actual knowledge of discrimination ... and fails ade-
quately to respond."9' In Oona, R.-S.- v. McCaffrey,92 the Ninth Circuit
held that school districts may be held liable for teacher-student
harassment when they fail to remedy a known hostile environment by
failing to supervise the teacher.93 In all of these cases, the courts
ultimately found that schools may be held liable for failing to remedy
sexual harassment. 94
Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit have found
support in Title VII precedent when concluding that Title IX, like Title
VII, also protects victims from peer hostile-environment sexual
85. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650-51(1999) (citing Meritor, 477
U.S. 57; Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998)).
86. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 650-51.
87. Oona, 143 F.3d at 477.
88. Franklin, 503 U.S. at 75.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 290 (1998).
92. 143 F.3d 473 (9th Cir. 1998).
93. Id. at 477-78.
94. See Gebser, 524 U.S. at 478; Franklin, 503 U.S. at 63-64, 76; Oona, 143 F.3d at 477-78.
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harassment. The Davis Court again cited Meritor for the proposition that
school officials' potential liability for failure to remedy known peer
hostile-environment sexual harassment under Title IX is triggered only
when a student's conduct is so "severe, pervasive, and objectively
offensive" as to deprive the victim of the educational opportunities
provided by the school.9" In Oona, the Ninth Circuit cited Ellison v.
Brady,96 a Title VII hostile-environment sexual harassment case, as
authority for finding that school districts are liable under Title IX for not
remedying peer hostile-environment sexual harassment in schools.97
Thus, both the U.S. Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit look to Title
VII precedent when determining what conduct amounts to peer hostile-
environment sexual harassment.
III. COURTS DO NOT AGREE ON A SINGLE REASONABLE-
NESS STANDARD TO DETERMINE WHETHER A VICTIM
EXPERIENCED SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Because the Davis Court did not adopt a specific reasonableness
standard to be used under Title IX to determine whether conduct is
objectively offensive, the historical debate among courts and legal
commentators regarding which reasonableness standard best aids in the
objective evaluation of harassing conduct continues in the Title IX
context. Some courts use the traditional reasonable-person standard to
determine whether harassing conduct was objectively offensive." In
reaction to what courts and commentators have identified as the failings
of the reasonable-person standard, some courts apply a reasonable-
woman standard. In Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc." and Oncale v.
Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc., c ° the U.S. Supreme Court could have
95. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650 (1999) ("Having previously
determined that 'sexual harassment' is 'discrimination' in the school context under Title IX, we are
constrained to conclude that student-on-student sexual harassment ... can likewise rise to the level
of discrimination actionable under the statute").
96. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
97. Oona, 143 F.3d at 477 ("We [have] expressly recognized that hostile environments include
peer harassment in Ellison v. Brady [924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991)] .... Accordingly, we hold that
the defendants are not entitled to immunity for their failure to take steps to remedy the hostile
environment created by the male students in Oona's class").
98. See, e.g., DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass'n, 51 F.3d 591,594 (5th Cir. 1995).
99. 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
100. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
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squarely resolved the question of which standard applies. Instead, the
decisions in those cases caused more rather than less confusion.
A. The Reasonable-Person Standard
The evolution of the reasonable-person standard, which can be traced
to the reasonable-man standard, originated in English common law as an
objective standard to which courts compared litigants' actions.'0 ' When
using this standard, courts occasionally consider certain defining
characteristics of the person whose conduct is being evaluated. For
example, courts have fashioned standards for a contextualized reasonable
man, 0 2 and in cases utilizing a reasonable-child standard when they find
that a child would not have interpreted facts in the same way as an
adult.'0 3 Although courts have resisted altering the reasonable-man
standard in order to create incentives for people to be careful,"° they
have sometimes raised the standard by requiring defendants to consider
the unique perspective of the person being harmed.'0 5 Recently, courts
have adopted gender-neutral language, changing the reasonable-man
standard to that of the reasonable person,0 6 and have applied the standard
to men and women alike. 0
7
101. See, e.g., Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490, 491 (1837). This Comment recognizes
the difference between judging the reasonableness of a defendant's conduct, as occurs in torts cases,
and judging the reasonableness of a plaintiff's response to some conduct, as occurs in discrimination
cases. Instead, however, this Comment considers whether the conduct of the person who is being
judged is objectively offensive.
102. See, e.g., Roberts v. Louisiana, 396 So. 2d 566, 567 (La. Ct. App. 1981) (establishing
standard for reasonable man with physical disability); Cordas v. Peerless Transp. Co., 27 N.Y.S.2d
198, 201 (1941) (reasonable man in emergency); Heath v. Swift Wings, Inc., 252 S.E.2d 526, 529
(N.C. Ct. App. 1979) (reasonable expert); Roth v. Union Depot Co., 13 Wash. 525, 545,43 P. 641,
647 (1896) (reasonable child of same age).
103. Roth, 13 Wash. at 545, 43 P. at 647.
104. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 283B(4), 895J(a) (1965); see also Johnson v.
Lambotte, 363 P.2d 165, 166 (Colo. 1961); Ellis v. Fixico, 50 P.2d 162, 164 (Okla. 1935) (holding
mentally ill people to same standard of care as mentally fit people).
105. See Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 558 (Okla. 1979) (holding that, in informed-consent
case, doctor must anticipate what reasonable patient would want to be informed of); see also
Nickerson v. Hodges, 84 So. 37, 39 (La. 1920) (holding that defendant should have anticipated that
plaintiff would experience emotional distress because of his actions).
106. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 (1965) (utilizing "reasonable man"
language), with Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (utilizing "reasonable person"
language).
107. See, e.g., DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass'n, 51 F.3d 591,594 (5th Cir. 1995)
(applying reasonable-person standard to woman).
Sexual Harassment in Schools
Courts have also utilized the reasonable-person standard as the generic
standard by which women's interpretations of discrimination are judged
to determine whether their reaction was reasonable. For example, in
DeAngelis v. El Paso Municipal Police Officers Association,"'8 the Fifth
Circuit found, under the reasonable-person standard, that when an
anonymous co-worker wrote harassing columns in a work newsletter that
harassed a female colleague by questioning her competence, her looks,
and her commitment to being a police officer because she was a woman,
this conduct would not be offensive to a reasonable person.' The court
in Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co."° used the reasonable-person stan-
dard to compare purportedly harassing conduct to what the court held to
be a societal norm that accepted the objectification of women through
pornography and the media in general."'
Some courts have criticized a purely objective reasonable-person
standard, particularly in the context of sex discrimination case law."'
This critique has focused on the reasonable-person standard's impact on
female victims of male harassment because women are largely the
victims of sex discrimination."' In Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co.," 4
the Ninth Circuit found that there is a perception gap between men and
women on the subject of sexual harassment, and that "words from a man
to a man are differently received than words from a man to a woman. " "s
The Ninth Circuit has also criticized the reasonable-person standard as
assessing reasonableness from the harasser's perspective, rather than the
victim's, thereby downplaying the adverse effect of offensive conduct." 6
A prominent commentator has also critiqued the reasonable-person
standard, claiming that it reifies a sexist community norm to which the
facts of the cases are compared." 7 Professor Nancy Erenreich has
108. 51 F.3d 591 (5thCir. 1995).
109. See Id. at 594-96.
110. 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
111. See id, at 620-21.
112. See, e.g., Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 632 (2d Cir. 1997); Bums v. McGregor Elec.
Indus., Inc., 989 F.2d 959,965 (8th Cir. 1993); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872,878 (9th Cir. 1991).
113. See Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879 (citing Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work
Environment Under Title VII, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1449, 1459 (1984)).
114. 25 F.3d 1459 (9th Cir. 1994).
115. Id. at 1464.
116. Elison, 924 F.2d at 878.
117. See Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of
Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1204-05 (1990) (discussing
Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611,621 (6th Cir. 1986)).
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argued that a community norm masks women's lack of power over what
norm is adopted and what aspects of life fit into that norm." 8 She
contends that the reasonable-person standard allows judges to clothe
their decisions in an aura of neutrality while making decisions based on
subjective ideals." 9 Professor Ehrenreich argues that the Rabidue court
based its conclusion on the false premise that societal norms are
egalitarian and nondiscriminatory. 2 ° Further, cloaking its decision in
such norms enabled the Rabidue court to ground its rationale in society's
view of acceptable conduct, thus avoiding a politically charged decision
about what kinds of conduct constitute harassment.'2'
B. The Reasonable-Woman Standard
Courts view harassment from a gender-specific perspective when they
use the reasonable-woman standard. Although men and women might
agree that some blatant conduct constitutes harassment, difficult cases
will produce some disagreement.' Given this difference in perspective
and given statistics indicating that women are more often the victims of
sexual violence,'24 several circuits have adopted the reasonable-woman
standard to determine when conduct rises to the level of hostile-
environment sexual harassment in the workplace.'25
In Ellison v. Brady,'26 the Ninth Circuit followed the Third, First, and
Sixth Circuits'27 when it held that the determination of what conduct is
118. See id. (noting that courts "implicitly assume that sexual discrimination is merely deviant
behavior by individuals, rather than a structural problem inherent in American ideology and
institutions" by focusing on whether harassing conduct was generally acceptable, "rather
than ... [on] whether it perpetuated conditions of inequality").
119. See id. at 1189-90 ("[Rlelativism translates into neutrality, a refusal to ground judicial
decisions on personal preferences for particular perspectives or political judgments about the
importance of certain group interests.").
120. See id. at 1205.
121. See id.
122. E.g., Bums v. McGregor Elec. Indus., Inc., 989 F.2d 959, 965 (8th Cir. 1993); Ellison v.
Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 880-81 (9th Cir. 1991).
123. See Elizabeth A. O'Hare & William O'Donohue, Sexual Harassment: Identifying Risk
Factors, 27 ARCHIVES SExuAL BEHAV. 561,574 (1998). Compare Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of
Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 634, 653-54 (1999) (agreeing that harassment amounting to criminal assault
was deplorable), with DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass'n, 51 F.3d 591, 593 (5th Cir.
1995) (finding gender-based harassment not objectively offensive).
124. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 879.
125. Torres v. Pisano, 116 F.3d 625, 632 (2d Cir. 1997); Burns, 989 F.2d at 965; Ellison, 924
F.2d at 880-81; Andrews v. City of Phila., 895 F.2d 1469, 1485 (3d Cir. 1990); Lipsett v. Univ. of
P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 906 (1st Cir. 1988); Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630, 637 (6th Cir. 1987).
126. 924 F.2d 872 (9th Cir. 1991).
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offensive should take into consideration only conduct that a reasonable
woman would consider offensive for Title VII purposes.12 The Ellison
court articulated three grounds supporting the reasonable-woman
standard. First, it reasoned that this standard "ensures that courts will not
sustain ingrained notions of reasonable behavior [protecting the]
offender."'29 Second, the court held that the reasonable-woman standard
better prevents the perpetuation of stereotypes that may be ingrained in
popular culture and thus better serves the purpose of Title VIL.3 ° Finally,
because Title VII is not based on the perpetrator's fault, but on employer
action, the court determined that the reasonableness standard used need
not focus on the motivation of the harassing action, but could focus, as
does the reasonable-woman standard, on the harassment's effect on
women.'31
Even though the reasonable-woman standard has resulted in more
findings of hostile-environment sexual harassment than has the
reasonable-person standard, 32 criticism of the standard abounds. 33 The
Fifth Circuit has found that the reasonable-woman standard is a
preferential one." Further, one critic has argued that the reasonable-
woman standard does not empower men to prevent possibly harassing
conduct because there is no way men can discern what a reasonable
woman would find offensive.3 5 The reasonable-person standard, the
critic claims, may better allow men to prevent their own harassing
conduct because it incorporates their viewpoint, thereby enabling them to
recognize the conduct as harassing.'36 This critic argues that use of the
127. See Andrews, 895 F.2d at 1485; Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 906; Yates, 819 F.2d at 637.
128. Eilison, 924 F.2d at 880; see also Brennan v. Metro. Opera Ass'n Inc., 192 F.3d 310,320-21
(2d Cir. 1999) (Newman, J., dissenting in part) (comparing sex discrimination to race discrimination
and stating that because most white people might not know that some remarks are offensive to most
black people, one can see why "(t]he perspective of the reasonable 'person' might turn out to be the
very stereotypical views that Title VII is designed to outlaw").
129. Ellison, 924 F.2d at 880-81 (citing Lipsett, 864 F.2d at 898 (quoting Rabidue v. Osceola Ref.
Co., 805 F.2d 611,626 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith, J., dissenting))).
130. Id. at 881.
131. Id. at 880.
132. Childers, supra note 76, at 894 n.133.
133. See, e.g., DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass'n, 51 F.3d 591, 593 (5th Cir.
1995); Naomi R. Cahn, The Looseness of Legal Language: The Reasonable-Woman Standard in
Theory and in Practice, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1398, 1417 (1992); Bittner, supra note 76, at 132.
134. DeAngelis, 51 F.3d at 593 (concluding that reasonable-woman standard would "create
incentives for employers to bend over backwards in women's favor for fear of lawsuits").
135. See Bittner, supra note 76, at 132.
136. Id.
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reasonable-woman standard conveys the message that sexual harassment
is not a serious issue, important to both men and women, but that courts
will remedy it only to placate oversensitive women. 3 7 Those who
criticize the reasonable-woman standard share the belief that the
reasonable-person standard is a non-preferential standard that aims to
enforce equality rather than preference.13
C. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. Does Not Resolve the Circuit Split
Regarding the Appropriate Reasonableness Standard
The U.S. Supreme Court first broached the issue of reasonableness in
the workplace discrimination context in its Harris decision in 1993.139
However, the Court granted certiorari in Harris to determine only
whether proof of psychological harm was necessary to prove subjective
offensiveness 4 ' and thus did not directly address the standard to prove
objective offensiveness. The Court stated in dicta that the standard used
to determine whether conduct was abusive or hostile must be objective
based on what the reasonable person would find hostile or abusive given
the totality of the circumstances.' 4' Although the Court's reference to all
of the circumstances suggested a subjective component to the standard, it
did not address the use of the reasonable-woman standard, even though
the parties briefed and argued this issue.'42 The Court failed explicitly to
include or exclude gender as one of the circumstances important to
determining objective offensiveness.'43 It thus failed to elaborate on the
extent to which courts can take gender into account, even though it was
aware of the circuit split on this issue." 4
After Harris, one circuit changed from the reasonable woman to the
reasonable-person standard,'45 another refused to adopt the reasonable-
woman standard,'46 and others applied a reasonable-person-in-the-
137. See id.
138. DeAngelis, 51 F.3d at 593; Bittner, supra note 76, at 132.
139. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
140. Id. at20.
141. Id. at 21-23.
142. See Brief for Petitioner at 34-35, Harris, 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (No. 92-1168); Transcript at
12, Harris, 510 U.S. 17 (No. 92-1168).
143. See Brief for Petitioner at 35, Harris, 510 U.S. 17 (No. 92-1168).
144. See id.
145. See Richardson v. N.Y. State Dep't of Corr. Serv., 180 F.3d 426,436-37 n.3 (2d Cir. 1999).
146. See DeAngelis v. El Paso Mun. Police Officers Ass'n, 51 F.3d 591, 593 (5th Cir. 1995).
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plaintiff's-position standard rather than a reasonable-woman standard. 47
The Eighth and Fifth Circuits have elected to apply the reasonable-
person standard because they believe Harris requires it.148 According to
these circuits, when the Court stated that the standard should be based on
the reasonable person, it foreclosed any other reasonableness
standards.'49 Other circuits have applied the reasonable-person-in-the-
plaintiff's-position standard by reasoning that Harris referred to this
standard when it stated that the objective element of proof may be met by
utilizing a reasonable-person standard.'
While the Ninth Circuit has followed Harris in applying an objective
standard when deciding Title VII cases, it has used the reasonable-
woman standard as its objective standard.'' Since Harris, district courts
in the Ninth Circuit have used jury instructions that refer to the
reasonable person in the plaintiffs position, but the court of appeals has
interpreted this standard to include a reasonable woman analysis. 52 In
Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., the court concluded that Ellison v.
Brady directs it to apply a reasonable-woman standard in the employ-
ment discrimination context."M In Fuller v. City of Oakland,' the Ninth
Circuit approved a reasonable-person-with-the-same-fundamental-
characteristics standard, but then analyzed the facts of the case under the
reasonable-woman standard, comparing the facts of the case to what the
147. See Brown v. Hot, Sexy, & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 540 (1st Cir. 1995); West v.
Phila. Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744,753 (3d Cir. 1995).
148. Gillmingv. Simmons Indus., 91 F.3d 1168,1172 (8thCir. 1996);DeAngelis,51 F.3dat594.
149. See Gillming, 91 F.3d at 1172; DeAngelis, 51 F.3d at 594.
150. Brown, 68 F.3d at 540 ("Mhe court must consider not only the actual effect of the
harassment on the plaintiff, but also the effect such conduct would have on a reasonable person in
the plaintiffs position."); West, 45 F.3d at 753 (concluding that discrimination must have "detri-
mentally affected a reasonable person of the same protected class in that position").
151. Steiner v. Showboat Operating Co., 25 F.3d 1459, 1464 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding that it must
consider what is offensive and hostile to reasonable woman).
152. Monteiro v. Tempe Union High Sch. Dist., 158 F.3d 1022, 1033 (9th Cir. 1998); see also
Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir. 1995); Steiner, 25 F.3d at 1464. The Ninth
Circuit is not alone in continuing to apply a more contextualized standard than the reasonable-person
standard espoused in Harris. E.g., King v. Frazier, 77 F.3d 1361, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting that
objective inquir "require[s] that sexual harassment be judged from the perspective of the one being
harassed'); Brown, 68 F.3d at 540; West, 45 F.3d at 753; Dey v. Colt Constr. & Dev. Co., 28 F.3d
1454, 1466 (7th Cir. 1994) ("We thus consider not only the actual effect of the harrasser's conduct
on his victim, but also the effect similar conduct would have had on a reasonable person in the
plaintiff's position.").
153. 25 F.3d 1459 (9th Cir. 1994).
154. Id. at 1464 (citing Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir. 1991)).
155. 47 F.3d 1522 (9th Cir. 1995).
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reasonable woman would feel.'56 In a later case, the Ninth Circuit
deemed a jury instruction that referred to a reasonable person with the
same fundamental characteristics as the plaintiff, rather than to a
reasonable woman, not to constitute an abuse of discretion.'57 The court
reasoned that this instruction incorporated the standards set out in both
the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Harris and its own in Ellison.'
58
Thus, when discussing whether conduct is objectively hostile under Title
VII, the Ninth Circuit uses conflicting terminology in upholding the use
of the reasonable-person-with-the-same-fundamental-characteristics
standard while referring to Ellison and the reasonable-woman standard.
When using the reasonable-person-in-the-plaintiff's-position standard,
courts take the plaintiff's particular characteristics into account. 5 9 In
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services, Inc.,' 60 the U.S. Supreme Court
stated that the objective severity of allegedly harassing conduct should
account for the social context in which conduct occurs and is
experienced. 16' Although the Court cited Harris for its standard, 62 it did
not use the exact terminology used in Harris. Instead, Oncale referred to
the "reasonable person in the plaintiff's position,"" and it did not state
whether the reasonable-person-in-the-plaintiff's-position standard is a
new standard altogether or simply a new name for the reasonable-person
standard. Circuit courts have used a similar standard but referred to the
reasonable person of the same protected class,"6 or the reasonable person
with the same fundamental characteristics. 165 Under these standards,
courts consider the totality of the circumstances when determining the
objective severity of alleged harassment.'66
While the Harris Court could have addressed the issue of the
appropriate reasonableness standard in sexual harassment cases, it did
not speak to the issue directly and different standards have abounded in
156. Id. at 1528 ("(T]he fact that she couldn't escape would lead a reasonable woman to feel her
working environment had been altered.") (emphasis added).
157. Crowe v. Wiltel Communications Sys., 103 F.3d 897, 900 (9th Cir. 1996).
158. Id.
159. See Brown v. Hot, Sexy, & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 540 (1st Cir. 1995); West v.
Phila. Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 753 (3d Cir. 1995).
160. 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
161. Id. at 80-82.
162. Id. at 81.
163. Id.
164. West, 45 F.3d at 753.
165. Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir. 1995).
166. See id. at 1527; West, 45 F.3d at 756.
Vol. 76:213, 2001
Sexual Harassment in Schools
the circuit courts since then. Some circuits agree with the Fifth Circuit
that Harris directs them to use a pure reasonable-person standard, rather
than a preferential reasonable-woman standard. Others subscribe to the
reasonable-person-in-the-plaintiff's-position standard, which considers
the totality of the circumstances. Others, including the Ninth Circuit,
have stated that they follow Harris, but interpret the case to allow for an
objective reasonable-woman standard.
IV. COURTS SHOULD ADOPT A REASONABLE-GIRL
STANDARD FOR TITLE IX PURPOSES
Courts should use a reasonable-girl standard to determine whether
conduct is objectively offensive such that it creates a hostile environment
in a school. A reasonable-girl standard is supported by legal precedent
and is consistent with U.S. Supreme Court interpretations of Title IX.
Further, it best serves the purposes of Title IX by furthering girls' equal
educational opportunities, and is therefore the best standard to determine
whether harassment rises to the level of actionable sexual harassment.
A. Precedent Using a Reasonable-Woman Standard Under Title Vff
Supports Adopting the Reasonable-Girl Standard Under Title MK
The reasonable-girl standard flows from an analogy to tort law and
Title VII jurisprudence. When evaluating a girl's reaction to harassment
in schools, the reasonable-girl standard would take a victim's sex and age
into consideration when .determining what conduct is objectively
offensive under Title IX. This perspective would create incentives for
boys and school administrators to learn what girls consider offensive and
to remedy that conduct. Because a "gender-neutral" reasonable-person
standard tends to ignore the experiences of females, the reasonable-girl
standard is needed to address this issue and allow girls to participate in
school activities on an equal footing with boys. Further, the reasonable
child standard in tort law6 7 reflects that a child's experience and
knowledge base are sufficiently unique that evaluation of children's
conduct requires a standard other than the generic reasonable-person
standard. Because the need for a separate reasonableness standard
reduces as a child matures, the reasonable-girl standard would only apply
to students who are in primary or secondary education. This standard
167. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
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would remain objective because it would not account for the
oversensitive or idiosyncratic girl who might find conduct offensive
when a reasonable girl would not. Thus, the reasonable-girl standard
would require that administrators consider whether the reasonable girl
would find the harassment offensive, not whether the administrators
themselves would find it offensive. Where a reasonable girl would find
the conduct to be severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive, schools
would be required to remedy the harassment.
Because both Title IX and Title VII cases conclude that sexual
harassment constitutes sex discrimination, 16 a reasonableness standard
used under Title VII should be applicable under Title IX. Title VII cases
using the reasonable-woman standard provide persuasive authority for
the adoption of a reasonable-girl standard in the Title IX context because
the U.S. Supreme Court and courts of appeals have used Title VII case
law to define many other key Title IX terms and to recognize particular
types of claims. 169 For instance, the U.S. Supreme Court looked to Title
VII case law to recognize peer-to-peer hostile-environment sexual
harassment claims under Title IX.'70 Further, the U.S. Supreme Court's
holding that objective offensiveness should be determined by looking at
the totality of the circumstances does not reject the reasonable-woman
standard.' Looking to the reasonable woman of Title VII and the Ninth
Circuit's reasonable person with the plaintiffs fundamental
characteristics," courts should adopt the reasonable-girl standard in the
Title IX context.
B. The Reasonable-Girl Standard Is Consistent with U.S. Supreme
Court Interpretations of Title IX
The reasonable-girl standard is consistent with the U.S. Supreme
Court's comparison of Title IX to Title VI and its interpretation of Title
IX as an implied contract.'73 This standard would only focus on the
existence of actionable sexual harassment without altering the standards
168. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1999); Meritor Say. Bank,
FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986).
169. See supra Part II.C.
170. See Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Schs., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992).
171. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998); Harris v. Forklift
Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
172. Fuller v. City of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir. 1995).
173. See supra Parts II.A.-B.
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of school liability. Title IX's contractual nature demands that schools be
notified of possible liability, and Title IX imposes liability only where
the schools were deliberately indifferent to the discrimination.
However, Title IX's contractual nature explains only how schools may
become liable for harassment; to determine whether conduct amounts to
harassment, the Court has looked to Title VII' 5 Although the
reasonable-girl standard would require schools to remedy more harassing
conduct than a gender-neutral standard might, the process by which a
school becomes liable would not change. Schools would still have to be
notified before they could become liable for sex discrimination. The only
change would be in the standard to determine whether the allegedly
harassing conduct could be reasonably considered offensive. Where the
reasonable-person standard applies a purportedly gender-neutral vision
of reasonableness, the reasonable-girl standard would simply apply a
gender-specific vision of reasonableness. 6
The reasonable-girl standard would not impose additional liability on
schools. The key inquiry in a sexual harassment in school claim is
whether the harassment rose to the level of actionable discrimination
under the statute rather than the appropriateness of the school's response.
Even under the reasonable-girl standard, courts would continue to apply
the "clearly unreasonable" standard to administrators' responses.' The
reasonable-girl standard would require the school to apply a new
standard to determine whether conduct was objectively offensive, and
thus rose to the level of actionable sexual harassment. But once the
school has made this decision, essentially any response would satisfy the
clearly unreasonable standard, which is highly deferential to schools'
determinations of what response is appropriate.' This deference would
remain regardless of what standard was used to determine whether the
conduct amounted to actionable harassment in the first place. Therefore,
while the reasonable-girl standard does alter the threshold of action, this
standard is unlikely to impose additional liability on schools because the
clearly unreasonable standard is so deferential to the school's
determination of what response is appropriate.
174. See, e.g., Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274,290 (1998).
175. See supra Part IIA.-C.
176. See supra Part III.B.
177. See supra notes 55-60 and accompanying text.
178. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629,650 (1999).
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The reasonable-girl standard also would not impose unpredictable
liability. The Court's focus in Title IX cases is on the school's reaction to
discrimination.'79 Title IX does not require a reasonableness standard that
affords the harasser the opportunity to know that he is harassing, as is
required in a fault-based tort case, because Title IX relies on the school's
deliberate indifference to harassment rather than on a harasser's fault to
determine liability for peer-to-peer hostile-environment sexual
harassment. 80 Under the reasonable-girl standard, the harasser would not
become liable for something he could not have predicted because he
would not be the defendant. 8' A gender-specific reasonable-girl standard
would still require that schools be notified of harassment and that
schools' remedial actions be evaluated by the courts, as is required by
Title IX 182 Therefore, under the reasonable-girl standard schools would
not be exposed to liability by conduct that they could not have identified
as sexual harassment because it is the school's reaction to the harassment
that is reviewed by courts, not their fault for actually committing the
harassment themselves.
C. The Reasonable-Girl Standard Best Fulfills the Purposes of Title IX
The reasonable-girl standard would best fulfill the purposes of Title
IX by furthering girls' equal educational opportunities. Neither the
reasonable-person nor the reasonable-person-in-the-plaintiff's-position
standard successfully protect girls' equal educational opportunities
because they do not address harassment that may be prevalent and that
girls would consider offensive. The reasonable-girl standard would
achieve this goal by focusing on girls' unique experiences and forcing
schools to address girls' complaints, thus finding offensive, severe and
pervasive harassment that so interferes with girls' educational
opportunities that it becomes actionable under Title IX.
179. See id. at 65 1.
180. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274,289 (1998).
181. See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 880 (9th Cir. 1991).
182. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 646-47.
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1. The Reasonable-Person and Reasonable-Person-in-the-Plaintiffs-
Position Standards Do Not Afford Girls Equal Educational
Opportunities
The reasonable-person standard, which uses a community norm to
determine objective offensiveness,'83 is inadequate because it considers
offensive only harassment that is outside the community norm. Title IX
does not merely exempt sex discrimination that is prevalent; it is aimed
at eliminating all sex discrimination that limits girls' equal educational
opportunities."s' Given the statistics indicating the prevalence of sexual
harassment in junior high and high schools,'85 the reasonable-person
standard is unable to eliminate much of this harassment precisely
because it is prevalent and therefore within the status quo. Schools need
only respond to harassment that is so severe and pervasive that it
interferes with girls' educational opportunities. In contrast, the
reasonable-person standard does not reach harassment that is severe and
pervasive when it is prevalent in the school. The community norm is not
determinative of whether the harassing conduct interferes with girls'
educational opportunities because conduct may interfere with a girl's
ability to take part in class regardless of whether it is prevalent in the
school. Instead, it is the girl's perception of harassing conduct that
determines whether potentially harassing conduct interferes with her
educational opportunities and thus frustrates the purpose of Title IX. By
measuring this perception against an objective standard, the reasonable-
girl standard would not take into account oversensitive or idiosyncratic
reactions to conduct.
Not only does the reasonable-person standard allow even severe and
pervasive harassment to continue by focusing on what society considers
offensive rather than on what girls would consider offensive, it reinforces
an often sexist community norm. The reasonable-person standard fails to
address root causes because it defines sexual harassment by relying on a
sexist community norm and concludes that only conduct that falls outside
that norm is objectively offensive.8 6 For example, when the Rabidue
court applied the reasonable-person standard, it found that potentially
harassing conduct was consistent with a societal norm that includes
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pornography and the objectification of women in the media. 8 7 The
defendant's conduct was not objectively hostile or abusive precisely
because this conduct was prevalent in society. 8 ' The Rabidue court
failed to question whether the societal norm it used was a sexist one.
Because sexual harassment, like objectification of women in the media,
is prevalent in schools,'89 much of it is considered objectively normal
rather than objectively offensive. The reasonable-person standard thereby
reinforces sexist community norms rather than remedying sex discrim-
ination.
By focusing on the community norm, the reasonable-person standard
ignores the unique experiences of girls that inform their interpretations of
potentially harassing conduct. Sexual harassment, sexual coercion, and
involuntary sexual intercourse are not uncommon among teenage girls."°
Women and girls experience sexual violence more often than males, and
men are the perpetrators more than ninety percent of the time.'' Because
of this unique perspective, girls are likely to interpret potentially
harassing conduct by boys differently than boys or men might. 9 The
reasonable-person standard is blind to women's and girls' different
interpretations of harassing conduct because it ignores prevalent sexual
violence against women.' 93 Because societal norms trump girls'
perspectives under the reasonable-person standard, girls will continue to
experience severe and pervasive harassment under this standard.
By allowing a baseline of sexual harassment, the reasonable-person
standard does not protect girls' access to equal educational opportunities.
This standard's failure to prevent the emotional distress and reduced
academic success 94 leads to unequal educational opportunities. This in
turn allows girls to continue to feel the effects of harassment."' The
effects that the thirteen-year-old girl in Federal Way, Washington,
experienced included being forced to move to a new school, where she
was removed from her friends and school activities, causing her to
187. Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611,620-21 (6th Cir. 1986).
188. See id.
189. See supra Part I.A.
190. See supra Part I.A.
191. Fineran et al., supra note 12, at 56.
192. Cf Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879 (9th Cir. 1991) (explaining perception gap in
employment-discrimination context).
193. See id.
194. See supra Part I.A.
195. See supra Part I.A.
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become emotionally and academically devastated." 6 The fallout from
harassment-severe emotional distress, fear, and anxiety that causes
absenteeism, tardiness, and reduced work productivity-limits girls'
educational opportunities.'97 When girls' grades are reduced because of
on-going harassment, they are not eligible for tangible educational
opportunities such as awards, jobs, colleges, and scholarships.'98 The
cumulative effects of sexual harassment that the reasonable-person
standard allows to continue amount to the type of non-physical but
effective reduction of educational benefits for girls that the Davis Court
expressly held were prohibited by Title IX.'9
Although it was mentioned in Oncale, the reasonable-person-in-the-
plaintiff's-position standard2" is ambiguous and does not provide courts
and school administrators with sufficient guidance. Circuit courts are
split over how to interpret the Oncale Court's use of this standard.2"' This
standard does not clarify for courts whether they are to consider only the
circumstances that the plaintiff experienced or those circumstances plus
the plaintiff's gender. 2 The reasonable-person-in-the-plaintiff's-position
standard takes the totality of the circumstances into account, 3 and this
may include gender to the extent that a reasonable girl would be the
appropriate reasonable person in the plaintiff's position when the victim
is not an adult and is female. However, because the Court has not
expressly stated that a gender-based interpretation is appropriate, schools
are still left with little guidance. Because the U.S. Supreme Court has not
resolved the circuit split regarding the use of the reasonable person or
reasonable-woman standard,2 ' the term "totality of the circumstances"
may be interpreted to support the use of a gender-specific or a gender-
neutral reasonable-person standard depending on the inclination of a
circuit court.
196. See Bartley & Pemberton-Butler, supra note 1.
197. See supra Part IA.
198. Fineran et al., supra note 12, at 55.
199. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629,650-51 (1999).
200. Oncalev. Sundowner Offshore Serv., Inc., 523 U.S. 75,81 (1998).
201. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
202. See Brennan v. Metro. Opera Ass'n, 192 F.3d 310,321 (2d Cir. 1999).
203. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 8 1; see also Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 5 10 U.S. 17,21 (1993).
204. See supra Part III.B.
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2. The Reasonable-Girl Standard Would Protect Girls 'Equal
Educational Opportunities
The reasonable-girl standard would offer more protection from the
reduced educational benefits caused by sexual harassment, and thus
better promote Title IX's goal of equal educational opportunities. The
U.S. Supreme Court stated in Davis that all severe, pervasive, and
objectively offensive harassment that reduces or limits girls' access to
educational opportunities violates Title IX.2°5 By penalizing severe,
pervasive harassment that the reasonable girl would fimd offensive and
focusing on girls' unique perspectives, the reasonable-girl standard
would eliminate more sexual harassment, which would in turn reduce the
negative effects of the harassment.2" Under the reasonable-girl standard,
the thirteen-year-old girl in Federal Way would not be forced to switch
schools to escape being groped and fondled in her school's hallways
because the threshold for action would be lower and administrators
would be compelled to take action to remedy harassment. The end result
would be more educational opportunities for girls, allowing them to
maintain their access to equal educational opportunities.
The reasonable-girl standard would increase administrator action and
discourage further harassment in schools by encouraging administrators
to view victims' complaints as credible. Because of shared experiences, a
male administrator may identify with a male perpetrator more readily
than with a female victim." 7 The administrator must choose between
opposing views of harassment: one that views the conduct as harmless
amusement and another that sees the conduct as offensive or as a prelude
to violence.°s The reasonable-girl standard would require administrators
to credit girls' perspectives of the harassing conduct, take a second look
at complaints of sexual harassment, and work harder at eliminating
something that disrupts girls' benefits from education. Once perpetrators
know that complaints of sexual harassment will be considered credible,
and that remedial action will be taken, they are less likely to harass
205. See Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650-51 (1999).
206. Schools would be informed of the reasonable-girl standard through the DOE Guidance on
Sexual Harassment, supra note 46, which courts refer to when determining school liability for
harassment under Title IX. E.g., id. at 65 1.
207. Cf Childers, supra note 76, at 884-85 (reaching same conclusion in employment-
discrimination context).
208. See id. at 886.
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someone again.2' Thus, sexual harassment that interferes with girls'
educational opportunities will decrease when courts use the reasonable-
girl standard to evaluate complaints of sexual harassment.
V. CONCLUSION
The Davis Court left open the question of which reasonableness
standard to apply in Title IX hostile-environment sexual harassment
cases. In doing so, the Court exposed schools to unpredictable liability
and left girls, common victims of sexual harassment in schools,
unprotected. Some circuit courts have already formulated the reasonable-
woman standard, a reasonableness standard that is meant to protect
women in the workplace from harassment that women consider hostile.
A reasonable-girl standard comports with the U.S. Supreme Court's
interpretation of Title IX as a contract and with the liability scheme that
the Court created for the Title IX context. The reasonable-girl standard
would not alter the notification requirement or the deliberate-indifference
liability scheme that results from Title IX's contractual nature. Further,
schools would still become liable under the reasonable-girl standard only
when schools' remedial responses to harassing conduct were clearly
unreasonable. Finally, this standard fits well with a statute such as Title
IX that does not inquire into the perpetrator's fault, but rather demands
that schools take appropriate remedial measures.
In order to protect schoolgirls, courts should modify the reasonable-
woman standard for the Title IX context by creating a reasonable-girl
standard and applying it when analyzing peer-to-peer sexual harassment
in school cases. Further, because the reasonable-girl standard would
recognize girls' unique perspective on sexual harassment, it is best
capable of reducing the rate of sexual harassment that has reached
epidemic proportions. The reasonable-girl standard would view all
severe and pervasive harassment that reasonable girls would perceive to
be offensive as objectively offensive, thereby addressing all sexual
harassment that interferes with girls' equal educational opportunities.
This standard is equipped to place girls back on an even playing field
with boys by holding schools liable when they allow girls to be subjected
to continued harassment.
209. Harassers often believe that harassment is acceptable at school, that everyone does it, and
that they will be able to get away with it. Jordan et al., supra note 13, at 296. Therefore, if school
administrators make harassment less common in schools, and they ingrain in their students that
harassment is unacceptable at school, harassers will not continue harassing other students.
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